Directed search, mismatch and efficiency by Gavrel, Frédéric
HAL Id: halshs-02083453
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02083453
Preprint submitted on 29 Mar 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Directed search, mismatch and efficiency
Frédéric Gavrel
To cite this version:
Frédéric Gavrel. Directed search, mismatch and efficiency. 2019. ￿halshs-02083453￿
Directed Search, Mismatch and Efficiency
Frederic Gavrel∗†
February 2019
Abstract
This short paper provides a directed search model of the labor market in
which the persistency of vacant jobs results from a mismatch problem, not
from a pure coordination problem. Since firms cannot commit to an output
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1 Introduction
In the real world, firms obviously use the wage they post as a means to attract workers
(i.e. a means to direct workers’ search). To some extent, as in the housing market,
the price of labor is likely to be renegotiated ex post, but assuming no renegotiation
seems to be the right starting point for an acceptable theory of wages. Thus, it is
not surprising that labor economists were not entirely satisfied with Pissarides (2000)
wage bargaining assumption.
In the literature on directed search (or competitive search, see Wright et al. (2017)
for a guided tour), where agents are usually homogenous, firms can commit to a posted
wage and (persistent) vacancies result from a pure coordination problem in workers’
search. Some firms have more applicants than needed whereas others have not any
applicant at all. The present paper develops an alternative approach in which workers
and jobs are heterogenous. We come back to the idea that the vacancy of jobs results
from the mismatch between those jobs and the workers who apply to them as in
Layard et al. (1991), thus not from a coordination problem which can be seen as a
restriction on workers’ mobility, hence as a short run phenomenon. In other words,
our basic argument is that the reason why some jobs remain vacant is not that firms
do not find any applicant. The reason rather is that the applicants they find are
unsuited, meaning that their productivities are lower than the posted wages.
Like Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), workers and jobs are horizontally differentiated
according to Salop circle. Firms post wages and workers then decide on the (single)
firm they will join - not on the probability of going to each firm, as usual in the
literature - depending on the wages and on the size of firms’ applicant pools. Ex
ante, workers do not know the quality of a match with the firm they choose. Next,
firms rank their applicants, select the best, and hire her if her productivity is higher
than their posted wage. If not, the job remains vacant. Thus, vacancies result from a
mismatch problem. As usual with wage posting, the wages are set by maximizing the
expected profits subject to the indifference constraint: in equilibrium, all applicant
pools should generate the same expected income for workers. Thus, when deciding
on its posted wage, a firm faces a tradeoff between its labor costs and its expected
output which grows with the number of applicants, hence with the wage. The model
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is closed by the assumption of free-entry. Concerning free-entry, it is worth noting
that in this context applicant ranking plays a crucial role as it creates a decreasing
relationship between job creation and expected profits. An important feature of our
model is that firms post a single wage (not as many wages as possible productivity
levels) and that the hiring cutoff (i.e. the productivity level below which the best
candidate is rejected) coincides with the wage. We believe that these assumptions
are quite reasonable since the output of a match is not verifiable by a third party,
meaning that firms can neither commit to a wage function (of productivity) nor to
a mismatch trigger lower than the wage. See for instance Peters (2010) for similar
incompleteness assumptions.
By contrast to usual directed search models, market equilibrium is (constrained)
inefficient. The reason for this is that firms cannot commit to a hiring cutoff lower
than the posted wage. As a consequence, in this credibility-constrained equilibrium,
wages are too high in terms of job rejection but too low in terms of job creation.
The reason is that a wage increase (hence, an increase in the hiring cutoff) lowers
the probability of filling a vacancy as well as the probability of finding a job. This
creates a wage moderation effect which explains why wages are too low as concerns job
creation. To make this point crystal-clear, we consider an hypothetical “unconstrained
equilibrium” in which firms actually can commit to the wage as a well as to the hiring
cutoff (different from the wage). We find that this unrealistic equilibrium is a social
optimum which satisfies two conditions. One the one hand, the hiring cutoff coincides
with the utility of leisure and, on the other hand, job creation fulfills the so-called
“generalized Hosios condition”, as Mangin and Julien (2017) put it. Firms internalize
the usual congestion effect. Overall, they also internalize that additional vacancies
reduce the number of applicants per firm, thus lowering the expected productivity of
the best applicant: the productivity effect. The social optimality of this hypothetical
equilibrium indicates how public policy could remedy the inefficiency of laissez-faire
(i.e. the credibility-constrained equilibrium). Public intervention should make the
hiring trigger be equal to the value of leisure. This can be achieved through a self-
financed tax/subsidy Pigovian system. We show that, under a binding condition, an
appropriate layoff tax associated with a minimum wage - equal to the unconstrained-
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equilibrium wage - can decentralize the social optimum.1
Following Wright et al. (2017), one can distinguish two strands of papers in the
literature on directed search. On the one hand, there are market utility models (as
Wright et al. put it) like Moen (1997) or Shimer (1996). Our setup is close to
these papers. We also examine the behavior of a deviant firm to deduce the wage
setting equation. But, contrary to this approach, we do not introduce search frictions
between a firm and its pool of applicants. In our setting, the reason why jobs can
remain vacant is that applicants are unsuited to them and the probability of such a
situation grows with an increase in market tightness. On the other hand, there are
models in which the microeconomic foundations are more explicit like Peters (1984),
Julien et al. (2000) or Burdett et al. (2001) and others. In these models, contrary to
ours, workers’ search strategies are mixed and the persistence of vacant jobs results
from a pure coordination problem, not from a mismatch problem as in the present
paper.2 There are also some directed search papers with heterogenous agents and
non contingent wages.3 See for instance Lang et al. (1999) or, more recently, Peters
(2010).4 In general, these papers seek at accounting for the dispersion of wages. To
that end, the agents are vertically differentiated and workers have some information
about the types of the jobs they apply to and on the composition of the applicants
pools of these jobs. In our setting, this information is only available ex post and
all agents face the same situation, implying that there is a unique equilibrium wage.
Our setup can also be related to the competing auction literature starting with work
by Mc Afee (1993) and Peters (1997). In some of these papers like Albrecht et al.
(2014), the type realization is an ex post shock like in ours. The difference is that in
our setup worker heterogeneity is not private value, but affects the value of the firm.5
1To our knowledge, this rationale for layoff taxes is new. In general the motivation for firing
taxes (or for experience rating) is that they make firms internalize the consequences of their dis-
missal behavior on unemployment costs. See for instance Blanchard and Tirole (2008), Cahuc and
Malherbet (2004), Gavrel (2018) or L’Haridon and Malherbet (2009).
2With infinite numbers of agents, these mixed-strategy models provide the market utility ap-
proach with a microeconomic foundation. In the limit, search frictions are described with urn-ball
matching.
3It is worth noting that in some of these papers, firms can commit to hire a worker whose
productivity is lower than the posted wage. See for instance Michelacci and Suarez (2006).
4Peters (2010) provides a brief review of the literature with heterogenous agents.
5Regarding the modeling of heterogeneity, different papers use Salop circle with bargained wages.
4
There are two ways of understanding the presence of vacant jobs. The literature
on directed search puts the emphasis on the coordination problem. Alternatively, the
present paper develops a directed search model of the labor market in which persistent
vacancies result from a mismatch problem. The implications are as follows. First,
mixed strategies are not required, which sounds more realistic. Second, due to a
credibility constraint, market equilibrium is unavoidably inefficient for crystal clear
reasons. Third, in a public policy perspective, this inefficiency is a (new) rationale
for the introduction of layoff taxes.
Section 2 describes our setup and defines an equilibrium of the labor market.
Section 3 provides the welfare analysis and study how public policy can decentralize
a social optimum.
2 Market structure and equilibrium
2.1 Market structure
In this market, there are ”very large” numbers of workers and firms who are risk-
neutral and heterogeneous. The number of workers is denoted by U . An important
feature of this economy is that workers and jobs are horizontally differentiated ac-
cording to Salop circular model.
The distance between the firm j and the worker i along the skills circle, denoted
by x, measures the mismatch between the offered skills of worker i and the skill re-
quirements of firm j. The output of a match (i, j) is then a decreasing (mismatch)
function y(x) of this distance. Assuming that the workers and the jobs are uniformly
distributed on the circle, one can see that to any circular model, defined by the mis-
match function y(x), one can associate a model of match specific productivities whose
cumulative distribution satisfies F (y) = 1 − 2x(y), with x(y) being the reciprocal of
y(x).6 This isomorphism allows us to use match specific productivities which are
simpler and more familiar than the circular model but, at this stage, we would like
to stress that this simple tool of analysis can be derived from first principles. Thus,
See for instance Marimon and Zilibotti (1999)(without on-the-job search), Gautier et al.(2010)(with
on-the-job search), or Gavrel (2012)(without on-the-job search but with recruitment selection).
6The circle length is normalized to one.
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the productivity of a match is assumed to be a random variable whose cumulative
distribution, F (y), is strictly increasing in the interval [0, 1], and such that F (0) = 0
and F (1) = 1. Its density is denoted by f(y) (f(y) > 0).
Another peculiarity concerns the matching process. We retain very simple but
understandable assumptions. As usual in wage posting models, workers know where
to find the firms as well as the wages which they have posted. But they don’t know
the quality of a match with these jobs. Depending on the posted wages and on the
number of applicants to each firm, a worker chooses which applicant pool to join.
We then exclude multiple applications, implying that ex post firms’ competition for
workers is ruled out.7 The same holds for ex post competition between the workers
of the same applicant pool.
The timing of this game is the following. In the first stage, firms freely decide on
entering the market or not. If they enter the market, they create a single vacancy,
paying the cost c to that end. Next, firms post a wage knowing that an increase
in this wage affects the size of their applicant pool. And, knowing those wages, the
workers decide on the applicant pool they will join (the job they will apply to) by
comparing the expected incomes associated with the different jobs. Finally, firms
interview all their applicants and select the best. If the output of the best worker is
higher than the wage, then they hire this worker. Notice that, as usual with wage
posting, firms are able to commit to the wage that they announce. As a consequence,
the wage plays two roles here. On the one hand, it is used as a means to compete
for workers, and it determines the output cutoff below which firms decide not to hire
their best applicant, on the other hand. This assumption sounds reasonable but it
clearly raises an efficiency issue, as emphasized in the welfare and policy analysis.
Formally, let w denotes the wage posted by a firm and n the number of its appli-
cants. The output of the best applicant is the maximum statistic of a sample of n
draws of the distribution F (.). Its density is
g(y, n) = nF (y)(n−1)f(y),
and the expected output of this firm is given by
7See Albrecht et al. for ex post competition for workers in a directed search model.
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∫ 1
w
g(y, n)ydy.
Consequently, the expected profits of this firm (gross of the entry cost, c), denoted
by π, satisfy
π = π̃(w, n) = n
∫ 1
w
F (y)n−1f(y)(y − w)dy.
Notice that the probability, m̃(w, n), of the firm filling its vacancy is given by
m̃(w, n) =
∫ 1
w
g(y, n)dy = 1− F (w)n.
Indeed, as F (w)n is the probability of all candidates having a productivity lower than
the wage, 1−F (w)n is the probability of at least one applicant having a productivity
higher than the wage, hence the probability of the firm hiring a worker.
As all applicants face the same situation, their probability of getting the job is
p = p̃(w, n) =
m̃(w, n)
n
.
A peculiarity of this model is that the wage, which acts as an output cutoff,
directly (negatively) affects the probability of filling a job as well as the probability of
finding a job. Regarding the size of the applicant pool, one can see that an increase
in the number of applicants raises the probability of the firm hiring a worker as well
as its expected output. By contrast, the probability of a candidate getting the job is
reduced.
It results that the expected income of an applicant to this firm, denoted by W ,
has the following expression:
W = W̃ (w, n) = d+
m̃(w, n)
n
(w − d),
with d being the utility of leisure.
As already mentioned, workers choose an applicant pool according to expected
incomes. The stability of the applicant pools then requires that they all generate the
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same expected income.8 For given wages, this indifference condition (which is a kind
of migration equilibrium) determines the distribution of workers across the applicant
pools (i.e. the firms with a vacancy). As the expected income is a decreasing function
of the number of applicants, we can deduce that such a distribution of workers across
firms is stable.
In what follows, ȳ denotes the expected output of a filled job, that is
ȳ = ˜̄y(w, n) =
n
∫ 1
w F (y)
n−1f(y)ydy
m̃(w, n)
.
Following the same line of reasoning as Gavrel (2012), one can show that, in
conformity with intuition, the expected output, ˜̄y(.), is an increasing function in the
number of applicants, n.
2.2 Market equilibrium
All firms with a vacancy know the indifference condition. They then set their posted
wage and the size of their applicant pool by maximizing their expected profit subject
to the indifference condition.
Let j denote a firm with a vacant job, ex ante. A market equilibrium can be defined
as a number of vacancies, V ∗, a pair of functions (w∗(j), n∗(j)), and an expected
income W ∗ such that
-i) W (j) = W ∗, for all j = 1, ..., V (indifference condition),
-ii) (w∗(j), n∗(j)) maximizes π(j) subject to the indifference condition W (j) = W ∗,
for all j = 1, ..., V ,
-iii)
∑V
1 n(j) = U ,
-iv) −c+ π(j) = 0 for all j = 1, ..., V (free-entry).
In general competitive analysis, the agents are price takers. Here, the firms which
are ”very small” take the expected income W as given. Thus, this model describes a
”competitive search” situation.
It is easy to see that this equilibrium is symmetric. As a consequence, in this
symmetric equilibrium, workers are uniformly distributed among firms, implying that
8The same holds in market utility models like Moen (1997). Contrary to this literature, we do
not introduce search frictions between a firm and its applicants.
8
all applicant pools have the same size, n = U/V = 1/θ, with θ denoting market
tightness.
In conformity with notational use, all function, x = x̃(w, n), is now expressed in
terms of market tightness, θ = V/U , that is x = x(w, θ) = x̃(w, 1/θ). We can then
define an equilibrium in a (much) simpler way:
Definition 1. A market equilibrium is a pair, (w∗, θ∗), which maximizes the expected
profit, π(w, θ), subject to the indifference constraint, W (w, θ) = W (w∗, θ∗), and which
satisfies the free-entry equation, −c+ π(w, θ) = 0.
As usual in directed search, the wage is determined by examining the behavior
of a deviant firm who sets the wage w and (the inverse of) its applicant pool, θ,
by maximizing its expected gross profit, π(w, θ), subject to the constraint that the
expected income of its applicants, W (w, θ) = p(w, θ)w + (1 − p(w, θ))d, be equal to
the expected income of other workers, W ∗.
Consider an interior private optimum (w > d). The indifference constraint im-
plicitly determines the posted wage as a function of market tightness. Differentiating
this equation gives the impact of an increase in market tightness on the wage. We
obtain:
dw
dθ
= −
∂p(.)
∂θ
(w − d)
p(.) + ∂p(.)
∂w
(w − d)
(1)
An increase in market tightness (a decrease in the number of applicants) lowers
the expected incomes. Holding the cutoff as a constant, a wage increase raises the
expected income as usual in market utility models (term p = θm > 0). But, here,
the wage also exerts a negative effect on the probability of an applicant being hired
by lowering the lower bound of the output (term ∂p(.)/∂w < 0). As a consequence,
a wage increase does not necessarily lead to an increase in the number of applicants
(i.e. a decrease in market tightness). If this negative effect is sufficiently strong, part
of the applicants will leave the deviant firm, implying that the firm should set a lower
wage.
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Let ε(m(.), w) denote the elasticity of m(.) to w in absolute value. Thus, an
interior (private) optimum should satisfy the following condition
Condition (IC). ε(m(.), w)w−d
w
< 1.
It results that the total derivative of expected profits with respect to market
tightness has the expression below
dπ(θ)
dθ
=
∂(m(.)ȳ(.))
∂θ
− ∂m(.)
∂θ
w −m(.)dw
dθ
.
Consider the term
−m(.)dw
dθ
=
m(.)
m(.) + ∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
[
m(.)
θ
+
∂m(.)
∂θ
](w − d).
We have
m(.)
m(.) + ∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
= 1−
∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
m(.) + ∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
.
Let Γ(.) denote the expression
Γ(.) ≡
∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
m(.) + ∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
= −
ε(m(.), w)w−d
w
1− ε(m(.), w)w−d
w
< 0 (2)
Substitution into the previous expression for the derivative yields
dπ(θ)
dθ
=
∂(m(.)ȳ(.))
∂θ
− ∂m(.)
∂θ
d+
m(.)
θ
(w − d)− Γ(.)m(.)
θ
(1− η(.))(w − d),
where η(.) denotes the elasticity of m(.) to θ in absolute value.
Since
∂m(.)ȳ(.)
∂θ
= −m(.)
θ
[η(.)ȳ(.) + α(.)(ȳ(.)− d)],
with α(.) being the elasticity of ȳ − d to θ in absolute value9, it follows that
9Note that the elasticities of m(.) and ȳ − d to θ are negative.
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θ
m(.)
dπ(θ)
dθ
= w − d− [η(.) + α(.)](ȳ(.)− d)− Γ(.)(1− η(.))(w − d),
implying that a private (interior) optimum should satisfy
w = d+
[η(w, θ) + α(w, θ)][ȳ(w, θ)− d]
1− Γ(w, θ)(1− η(w, θ))
(3)
It is worth noting that, as the equilibrium value of workers’ expected income
is deduced from the equilibrium values of the wage and the market tightness, the
previous equation only means that in a private optimum (of firms) firms and workers
face the same marginal exchange rate between the wage and the number of applicants.
Note also that, under condition (IC), the wage actually is higher than the value of
leisure.
On the other hand, the free-entry equation can be written as
−c+m(w, θ)(ȳ(w, θ)− w) = 0 (4)
To summarize:
Proposition 1. A market equilibrium is a pair, (w∗, θ∗), which jointly satisfies equa-
tions (3), and (4).
In the following, we also refer to this market equilibrium as the credibility-constrained
equilibrium. Indeed, posting a wage higher than the output cutoff is not credible.
3 Efficiency and public policy
We now show that, despite wage posting, the market equilibrium (i.e. the credibility-
constrained equilibrium) is inefficient. Then, to get a precise understanding of this
result, we consider the hypothetical case in which firms can commit to an output
cutoff lower than the posted wage. We refer to this equilibrium as the unconstrained
equilibrium. On this basis, we determine how public policy can restore efficiency.
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3.1 Social optimum and market efficiency
As usual, our welfare criterion is the (net) aggregate income. The (net) aggregate
income per head, denoted by Σ, depends on two variables which are the output cutoff,
ŷ, and the number of jobs per worker, n = U/V = 1/θ, with θ being market tightness.
It can be written as follows
Σ = Σ(ŷ, θ) = −θc+ θm(ŷ, θ)ȳ(ŷ, θ) + [1− θm(ŷ, θ)]d (5)
It is easy to see that, whatever market tightness might be, the optimum cutoff
coincides with the utility of leisure, d. Thus, the aggregate income can be rewritten
as
−θc+ θm(d, θ)ȳ(d, θ) + [1− θm(d, θ)]d (6)
Differentiating the social surplus per worker with respect to θ gives
−c+ [m(.) + θ∂m(.)
∂θ
](ȳ(.)− d) + θm(.)∂ȳ(.)
∂θ
It follows that the first order condition for the maximization of the aggregate
income can be written as
∂Σ(d, θ)
∂θ
= −c+m(d, θ)[1− η(d, θ)− α(d, θ)][ȳ(d, θ)− d] = 0 (7)
With α(.) = 0, we would obtain the usual Hosios condition for the efficiency of
job creation. With α(.) > 0, we face the “generalized Hosios condition” as Mangin
and Julien (2017) put it.
This optimality condition takes into account two externalities of an increase in
the number of vacancies. The first is the usual congestion effect. The second effect
results from the ranking of candidates. As already mentioned, it is easy to check
that an increase in market tightness lowers the average output: the elasticity of ȳ− d
with respect to θ (−α(.)) is negative. In conformity with intuition, more vacancies
lower the number of applicants per firm, implying that the average of the maximum
statistic is reduced. This negative productivity effect tends to reduce job creation in
an optimum. In other words, if the basic Hosios condition holds, then job creation is
excessive.
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Let us now compare the credibility-constrained equilibrium (market equilibrium
of Proposition 1) with the social optimum. Substitution of the wage equation (3) into
the free-entry condition (4) yields
−c+m(.)[1− α(.) + η(.)
1− Γ(.)(1− η(.))
](ȳ − d) = 0 (8)
Knowing that the equilibrium wage is higher than the value of leisure, the com-
parison of equations (7) and (8) show that the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficient
in terms of the output cutoff as well as in terms of market tightness. For obvious
reasons, lowering the cutoff for a given labor cost - meaning that only the probabilities
m(.) and p(.) are (positively) affected - increases the aggregate income. This holds
true for any cutoff higher than the value of leisure. Lowering the cutoff makes that
some viable matches are no longer rejected. Now, since Γ(.) < 0, equation (8) implies
that the derivative of the aggregate income with respect to market tightness,
−c+m(.)[1− (η(.) + α(.))](ȳ − d) < −c+m(.)[1− η(.) + α(.)
1− Γ(.)(1− η(.))
](ȳ − d) = 0,
is strictly negative in the neighborhood of market equilibrium. This means that
job creation is excessive. On the other hand, one can check that, according to the
free-entry equation (4), market tightness is a decreasing (implicit) function of the
wage. A small increase in the labor cost for a given rejection trigger - meaning that
probabilities m(.) and p(.) are left unchanged - increases the aggregate income. To
summarize, we can state the following
Proposition 2. In market equilibrium, the wage is too high in terms of match rejec-
tion but, too low in terms of job creation
The reason why the wage is too low regarding job creation is that its negative
impact on the transition rates (m(.) and p(.)) exerts a wage moderation effect.
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3.2 Unconstrained equilibrium and public policy
3.2.1 Relaxing the credibility constraint makes equilibrium efficient
To reach a better understanding of the welfare results as well as to drive the analysis
of public policy, we here consider the (unrealistic) case in which firms could commit
to the wage as well as to the output cutoff. In other words, in this “unconstrained”
equilibrium, firms are assumed to be able to disconnect the cutoff, ŷ, from the wage,
w. Consequently, the transition probabilities m(.) and p(.) no longer depends on the
wage but on the cutoff (as in the determination of a social optimum).
Let us first study how the output cutoff is determined in this situation. To that
end, we show that for a given applicant pool - meaning that any variation in the
cutoff should be associated with an appropriate variation in the wage which keeps
workers’ expected income constant - the optimum of expected profits is reached for
ŷ = d.
The proof is as follows. First, from the indifference condition,
p(ŷ, θ)w + (1− p(ŷ, θ))d = W,
we deduce workers’ marginal rate of substitution between the wage and the cutoff
dw
dŷ
= −
∂m(ŷ,θ)
∂ŷ
m(ŷ, θ)
(w − d) (9)
For obvious reasons, this MRS is positive. Indeed, holding the expected income,
W , constant, an increase in the cutoff leads to a decrease in the probability of getting
the job. This is is neutralized by a wage increase.
In this unconstrained case, the expected profits (gross of entry costs) are written
as
π = π(ŷ, θ, w) =
1
θ
∫ 1
ŷ
F (y)
1−θ
θ f(y)(y − w)dy.
Consequently the total derivative of expected profits with respect to the cutoff,
for a given market tightness, is
dπ
dŷ
= −1
θ
F (ŷ)
1−θ
θ f(ŷ)(ŷ − w)−m(ŷ, θ)dw
dŷ
(10)
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Knowing that
∂m(ŷ, θ)
∂ŷ
= −1
θ
F (ŷ)
1−θ
θ f(ŷ),
substituting (9) into (10) yields
dπ
dŷ
=
∂m(ŷ, θ)
∂ŷ
(ŷ − d) (11)
Since ∂m(ŷ, θ)/∂ŷ < 0, we deduce from the previous derivative that an increase
in the cutoff raises (reduces) profits if and only if the cutoff is lower (higher) than
d, whatever the number of applicants is. Unsurprisingly, this means that in an un-
constrained equilibrium , the cutoff necessarily coincides with the domestic output.
What implies that firms would be able to commit to a cutoff which can generate a
loss.
Let us now turn to wage setting. The wage is derived from the maximization of
profits subject to the indifference condition for ŷ = d. In the unconstrained situation,
using the indifference constraint, the expected profit can be rewritten as a function
of market tightness Π(θ):
Π(θ) = m(d, θ)[ȳ(d, θ)− d]− W − d
θ
.
Thus, maximizing the expected profit with respect to θ gives
p(.)
θ2
(w − d) = −∂m(.)
∂θ
(ȳ(.)− d))−m(.)∂(ȳ − d)
∂θ
.
Or
w = d+ [η(d, θ) + α(d, θ)][ȳ(d, θ)− d] (12)
From the substitution of (12) into the free-entry condition
−c+m(d, θ)[ȳ(d, θ)− w] = 0,
we deduce the equation for the social optimality of market tightness (equation 7).
We can state
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Proposition 3. In the absence of the credibility constraint, equilibrium is efficient.
We would like to stress that this unconstrained equilibrium is purely theoretical.
Firms cannot commit to an output cutoff lower than the wage. Nonetheless, this
possibility explains why market equilibrium (as defined in Proposition 1) is inefficient
and how public policy could remedy this inefficiency.
3.2.2 Public policy. A rationale for layoff taxes
From the analysis above, we can deduce that if firms are given the incentive to decide
on a trigger equal to the value of leisure, then market efficiency will improve. There
exist different Pigovian tax/subsidy schemes whose introduction in the credibility-
constrained equilibrium (defined in Proposition 1) are capable of creating the right
incentive for firms, i.e. of “tying their hands”. The simplest one consists of taxing ex
post vacancies while subsidizing all jobs.
Suppose that tax authorities levy a tax f on (ex post) vacant jobs which is dedi-
cated to the financing of a subsidy to job creation (i.e. a subsidy to all created jobs),
h. In so doing, tax authorities collect the (total) tax amount, (1−m(.))V f , and pay
the (total) subsidy amount, V h. The balanced budget constraint then implies that
h = (1−m(.))f .
The Pigovian tax, f , should ensure that firms decide on the trigger ŷ = d < w.
To that end, the ex post loss, w − d, should be equal to this “non-hiring” tax, f . If
the maximum productivity (among the applicant pool) is higher (lower) than d, then
the firm hires (rejects) its best applicant.
It is worth noting that this tax/subsidy scheme resembles a layoff tax. In gen-
eral, the motivation for layoff taxes is that firms should perceive that their layoff
behavior increases the costs of unemployment. These costs result from unemploy-
ment insurance. See Blanchard and Tirole (2008) for instance. Our analysis shows
that introducing a layoff tax is desirable even in the absence of unemployment insur-
ance (workers being risk-neutral). To our knowledge, this rationale for layoff taxes is
novel.10
10Building on Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), another strand of literature argues that the layoff tax
allows firms to reduce their efficiency wage (or their monitoring costs) by committing them to a
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However, introducing a layoff tax is not sufficient to restore efficiency. Public
policy should also act on job creation. As an illustration, following Flinn (2006), we
consider the introduction of a minimum wage, σ. Let θS denote the socially optimal
value for market tightness (equation (7)). From the analysis above (equation (12)),
we deduce that the minimum wage should be set to
σ = σS ≡ d+ [η(d, θS) + α(d, θS)][ȳ(d, θS)− d].
We now show that this minimum wage, σS, associated with the layoff tax, fS =
σS−d, permits the decentralization of the social optimum if and only if the following
(binding) condition,
Condition (BC). η(d, θS) < ε(m(d, θS), w)
σS−d
σS
,
is satisfied.
Due to the budget constraint, we can see that with the pair (σS, fS) the equilibrium
equation for job creation,
−c+m(d, θ)(ȳ(d, θ)− σS) = 0,
coincides with the (social) optimum equation. But this not sufficient. The min-
imum wage σS should be binding, meaning that firms should not be willing to set
a higher wage than this minimum. We must show that, under condition (BC), the
total derivative of expected profits with respect to the wage is negative. The calculus
of the (total) derivative of the expected profits with respect to θ is very close to the
proof of Proposition 1. The appendix shows that this derivative has the following
expression:
θ
m(.)
dπ(θ)
dθ
= w − d− [η(.) + α(.)](ȳ(.)− d)− [η(.)f + Γ(.)(1− η(.))(w − d)] (13)
For the minimum wage, σS, and the layoff tax, fS = σS−d, the derivative reduces
to
dπ(θ)
dθ
= −m(.)
θ
[η(.)fS + Γ(.)(1− η(.))fS].
lower separation rate (which raises the utility of non-shirking workers). See Saint Paul (1995), Fella
(2000), and Fath and Fuest (2005).
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Thus, the derivative of the expected profits with respect to market tightness,
dπ/dθ has the same sign as
−η(d, θS)− Γ(d, θS)(1− η(d, θS)),
or11
−η(d, θS) + ε(m(d, θS), w)
σS − d
σS
.
The previous expression is positive under condition (BC). Since dw/dθ < 0 under
condition (IC) (see the appendix), this proves that the minimum wage, σS, is binding
under condition (BC).
To summarize:
Proposition 4. Under condition (BC), the minimum wage, σS, coupled with the
layoff tax, fS = σS − d, permits the decentralization of a social optimum.
One could wonder why the optimum minimum wage is not necessarily binding.
The reason is that the layoff tax can create an incentive to raise the wage. Indeed,
a wage increase attracts more applicants to the job. This lowers the probability of
firing (not hiring) the best applicant, then the probability of paying the layoff tax.
This effect is unlikely to overcompensate the direct increase in labor costs, meaning
that condition (BC) sounds reasonable.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops a directed search model with heterogeneous agents in which the
vacancy of jobs results from a mismatch problem. Under the reasonable assumption
that firms cannot commit to a mismatch cutoff which could generate losses, laissez-
faire equilibrium is inefficient. But, under a binding condition, associating a minimum
wage with a layoff tax permits the decentralization of a social optimum.
From a purely theoretical perspective, it is not surprising that labor theorists first
soke at providing a model in which agents are homogenous. We subscribe to this
11Remember that the analysis restricts to the case in which dw/dθ < 0, hence to the case in which
ε(m(.), w) < 1.
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criterion of good theory. But the application of this criterion revealed to be quite
difficult, implying that one is led to introduce some ad hoc hypothesis like mixed
strategies or search frictions between a firm and its applicants. We acknowledge that
our model is a “lesser evil”, but we believe that horizontal heterogeneities are a better
solution than mixed strategies. Relaxing the assumption of applicant ranking would
lead to a simple model better suited to applied theory. We conjecture that the same
inefficiencies (leading to the same policy measures) would hold if it were assumed that
firms interview their applicants one by one until they find one whose productivity is
higher than their posted wage. An interesting area for further investigations would
consist of introducing Bertrand competition for the job when all applicants have a
productivity lower than the wage.
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Appendix. Derivative of expected profits in the
presence of a layoff tax
In the presence of the layoff tax, the expected profits have the following expression:
π(w, θ) =
∫ 1
w−f
g(y, θ)ydy −m(w − f, θ)w − (1−m(w − f, θ))f.
On the one hand, the derivative of profits with respect to the wage reduces to
∂π(.)
∂w
= −m(.).
On the other hand, the derivative of expected profits with respect to market
tightness is written as
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∂π(.)
∂θ
=
∂(m(.)ȳ(.))
∂θ
− ∂m(.)
∂θ
(w − f).
Now, from the indifference constraint, we deduce
dw
dθ
= −
∂p(.)
∂θ
(w − d)
p(.) + ∂p(.)
∂w
(w − d)
< 0.
It follows that the total derivative of expected profits with respect to market
tightness has the expression below.
dπ(θ)
dθ
=
∂(m(.)ȳ(.))
∂θ
− ∂m(.)
∂θ
(w − f)−m(.)dw
dθ
.
Consider the term
−m(.)dw
dθ
=
m(.)
m(.) + ∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
[
m(.)
θ
+
∂m(.)
∂θ
](w − d).
We have
m(.)
m(.) + ∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
= 1−
∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
m(.) + ∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
.
Let Γ(.) denote the expression
Γ(.) ≡
∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
m(.) + ∂m(.)
∂w
(w − d)
= −
ε(m(.), w)w−d
w
1− ε(m(.), w)w−d
w
.
Substitution into the previous expression for the derivative yields
dπ(θ)
dθ
=
∂(m(.)ȳ(.))
∂θ
+
∂m(.)
∂θ
(f − d) + m(.)
θ
(w − d)− Γ(.)m(.)
θ
(1− η(.))(w − d).
As
∂m(.)ȳ(.)
∂θ
= −m(.)
θ
[η(.)ȳ(.) + α(.)(ȳ(.)− d)],
we obtain equation (13) of the text.
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